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essarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I appreciate comments provided
by my colleagues in the Research Division at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Richard G.
Anderson and Kevin L. Kliesen provided espe-
cially valuable assistance. However, I take full
responsibility for errors.
OUR PRODUCTIVITY EXPERIENCE
Our economy is a dynamic, ever-changing
system. As a result, productivity growth ebbs and
flows, often for reasons only imperfectly under-
stood. Yet, all economists appreciate that the
interaction among productivity, innovation and
education is crucial to maximizing economic
growth.
There is now little doubt that the pace of
productivity growth in the United States rose
during the last decade. From 1995 to 2001, non-
farm labor productivity grew at an annual rate of
nearly 2.5 percent, more than a percentage point
faster than the disappointing performance seen
from 1973 to 1995. Increases in business efficiency
boosted expectations of the future growth of cor-
porate earnings. Increased efficiency also lowered
unit labor costs and allowed steady increases in
wages without triggering higher inflation. In turn,
higher expected earnings fed into higher equity
prices. Both the higher real earnings—earnings
after adjustment for inflation—and increased
wealth supported strong gains in the average
household’s standard of living. A higher standard
of living is precisely what we desire from effective
technology transfer.
H
ow economies grow and prosper is
one of the central questions of eco-
nomics. At least since the time of
Adam Smith, economists have rec-
ognized that enhancing living standards is as
easy as P.I.E.: combine productivity, innovation,
and education. Productivity growth is the critical
factor that determines future living standards.
Such growth, in turn, depends on the birth of
new ideas—innovation and invention—and our
ability to turn such ideas into usable technology—
that is, technology transfer. Both, in turn, depend
on education.
Speeding innovation through government
assistance is not a new idea. In 1974, for example,
the U.S. government’s varied research laboratories
joined together to form a consortium to promote
technology transfer; in 1986 their efforts were codi-
fied into federal law by the Federal Technology
Transfer Act. A number of new applicable tech-
nologies have resulted from this public-private
liaison, including new tests to rapidly identify
food contamination and new chemicals (spun
off from the NASA space exploration program)
to increase the cooling capacity of your automo-
bile air conditioner. Numerous other examples are
available on the consortium’s Internet web site.
But, my topic tonight is not to speak of indi-
vidual new technologies. Rather, I will discuss
how economists—and especially policymakers—
think of technology. In so doing, I am going to
focus my remarks on productivity growth, a result
of technology transfer.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not nec-What caused these events of the 1990s? In
the early 1990s, innovations in the production of
microprocessors and related semi-conductors
allowed sharp decreases in the prices of comput-
ing and telecommunications equipment. In turn,
businesses aggressively reorganized their manage-
ment information systems. In addition, other
entrepreneurs quickly introduced machine tools,
material-handling equipment, and similar capital
goods that contained embedded microprocessors.
Some economists have equated the importance of
this technology transfer—that is, the successful
combination of innovation and technology so as
to improve productivity—with the introduction
of the electric dynamo during the last part of the
19th century and the widespread adoption of sci-
entific agriculture during the early 20th century.
Let me emphasize that the productivity
improvement we’re discussing required innova-
tions in hardware, in software and in business
processes. Any two of these without the third
would have yielded disappointing results.
Wal-Mart Corporation is perhaps the most
widely discussed example of how the adoption of
lower-cost communications and information pro-
cessing equipment can make possible fundamental
changes in business management. Wal-Mart’s
information systems deliver data—hour-by-hour,
product-by-product and store-by-store—both to
management and to Wal-Mart’s distribution cen-
ters. Such information systems are expensive, to
be sure—but the benefits seem to have exceeded
the costs. Last year, Wal-Mart became the nation’s
largest firm measured by annual sales. Yet, Wal-
Mart’s success did not depend just on innovations
within the confines of that firm. Because Wal-Mart
encouraged its suppliers to link to its information
system, those suppliers have improved their infor-
mation and inventory management systems. In
turn, the suppliers of those firms have found it
profitable, and often necessary, to improve their
information and inventory management systems,
and so on. Through this tiering process, Wal-Mart
itself has become a powerful engine of technology
transfer for the entire U.S. economy.
The close relationship between technology
transfer and economic prosperity is a prominent
theme in economic history. Economic historians
seem to agree that large gains in living standards
do not arise from specific innovations or inven-
tions but, rather, from the application of such
innovations by those seeking to capitalize on them.
The noted historian Angus Maddison has argued
that 1820 marked a major turning point in eco-
nomic history. About 1820, businesses began pro-
ductive use of the innovations of the 18th century,
including the steam engine, the railroad locomo-
tive and chemical processes like bleaching. Ever
since that time, the economy’s ratio of capital to
labor has tended to increase fairly steadily—and
productivity along with it. As a consequence, in
England and the United States output per capita
began to double approximately every 40 to 50
years. Although modest-sounding by today’s
standards, this advance was truly remarkable: in
total, during the previous millennium, worldwide
real GDP per capita had increased only about 50
percent.
Productivity growth during the 20th century
followed that of the 19th century—adoption of
important innovations raised productivity growth.
As a consequence, U.S. output per capita began
to double about every 30 years. Not surprisingly,
the annual growth rate of nonfarm business pro-
ductivity slowed during the Depression, averag-
ing approximately 1½ percent between 1929 and
1938. In the United States, the “Golden Age”
seems to have been 1950 to 1973, when produc-
tivity increased at almost a 3 percent annual rate.
Around 1973, however, U.S. productivity
growth began to stall. From 1973 to 1995, nonfarm
labor productivity grew at a Depression-like 1.4
percent annual rate. As with many significant
economic events, there doesn’t seem to be a simple
explanation for the decline. Nor was the produc-
tivity slowdown recognized immediately. By 1976,
however,itwasevidentthatsomethingstructurally
significant had happened to the U.S. economy. In
1977, a full four to five years after the slowdown
started, the Council of Economic Advisers, then
headed by Alan Greenspan, trimmed its estimate
of potential GDP growth from about 4 percent to
3.5 percent. But later events were to show that
even that rate was much too optimistic.
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The 1977 Economic Report of the President argued
that the permanent increase in real energy prices
following the Arab oil embargo likely was a signifi-
cant factor. Other factors included higher inflation,
a dramatic escalation in environmental and work-
place regulations, and an influx of a large number
of persons into the labor force for the first time,
especially women and teenagers. Subsequent
economic research has reached essentially the
same conclusion. Interestingly, though, the oil
shock story continues to be favored by many
economists.
Overall, real per capita income in the United
States has increased more than eight-fold during
the last 200 years. The pace has been uneven, both
in time and geography, but it has been remarkable
nonetheless. Today, we can only hope that the
roughly 2½ percent annual growth in U.S. labor
productivity since 1995 continues. Even a 2 per-
cent growth trend would be superior to the econ-
omy’s dismal productivity performance during
the 1970s and much of the 1980s.
BOOSTING PRODUCTIVITY
THROUGH INNOVATION
According to official productivity data com-
piled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the
post-1973 slowdown—that is, relative to the pro-
ductivity surge that occurred from 1948 to 1973—
was attributable entirely to a slowdown in the
rate of technical progress, what economists call
total factor productivity, or TFP.
To understand what TFP means, note that
economists attribute output growth to three com-
ponents: increases in labor input, growth in the
nation’s capital stock, which increases capital
input, and everything else. We think of the catchall
term “everything else” as reflecting advances in
knowledge because this is the part of output in
excess of what can be accounted for by measured
inputs of labor and capital. No self-respecting
discipline would ever name an important concept
“everything else,” so in the productivity literature,
thistermisreferredtoas“totalfactorproductivity.”
Economists use statistical models of the
economy’s production process to separate these
three components. Measuring the first two com-
ponents is difficult but relatively straightforward
because firms report to the government each year
both their employment and their capital purchases
and depreciation. Measuring true innovation—
changes in our knowledge of how to do things—
is difficult. In fact, this extremely important
component is typically measured as a residual—
everything else—after accounting for other factors.
Despite this difficulty, there are many things
that we do know about what fosters innovation—
and what doesn’t. Writing chiefly about informa-
tion technology (IT), Stanford University
economist Timothy Bresnahan has argued that
IT innovations by themselves are of little value
to the aggregate economy. He argues that another
two key developments must also occur. First, the
invention must be an “enabling technology.”
That is, it must be one that can be used in numer-
ous applications—these are the ones that eventu-
ally will boost growth. Second, the most valuable
innovations are those with network effects, a
type of economic externality. In other words, the
value created by an IT innovation is related to
the breadth of its use across the economy. But,
these benefits may take a long time to appear.
A common example among economic histo-
rians is early 20th century electrification. Electri-
fication enhanced productivity by increasing
flexibility and allowing manufacturers to use
labor and capital more efficiently. For example,
electrification enabled use of continuous-process
techniques such as the factory assembly line.
Efficiency also improved with the widespread
adoption of “unit drive,” that is, the use of rela-
tively inexpensive, dedicated electric motors to
power individual machines and tools, rather
than using a system of shafts and belts powered
by a single central engine. Unit drive brought
savings through reduced energy usage, less wear
and tear, and more flexible and efficient factory
design. Electrification also enhanced productivity
by improving factory lighting and safety.
But this process didn’t occur overnight. Firms
are reluctant to scrap old technologies, typically
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merely on the unproven promise of newer ones.
Hence, these benefits are delayed by substantial
adjustment costs related to reorganizing the way
of doing business—what Bresnahan calls “co-
invention” costs. Initially, early adopters prove
that the new techniques work. Later, as wider
adoption of these innovations creates some econ-
omy of scale in the production of the new equip-
ment, the cost of the new technology decreases,
providing a further incentive for firms to finally
take the leap to the newer technologies.
Recognizing these trends seems easy with
the benefit of hindsight. It is not hard to find the
successes; the false starts and outright failures
may never appear in the historical record. In prac-
tice, however, parsing current economic data
does not readily yield clues to emerging trends
that may be the result of past innovations. The
most obvious example in recent years was the
policy debate from about 1995 to 1998. On the
one side were the so-called “New Economy”
apostles, those who believed that innovations
associated with the microchip had permanently
increased the growth rate of labor productivity.
According to this group, the economy’s potential
growth had risen to approximately 3 to 3.5 per-
cent—implying a long-run productivity growth
rate of 2 to 2.5 percent (the remaining 1 percent
growth attributable to labor force growth). Some
New Economy advocates apparently had much
higher growth rates in mind, although they typi-
cally did not commit to specific estimates. On the
other side were the “traditionalists,” those who
believed that real GDP growth was beginning to
rise mainly because of cyclical dynamics (gradual
re-employment of slack resources), or other tem-
porary factors, and that once those benefits had
been exhausted, the economy would be back to a
longer run trend growth rate of about 2.5 percent,
as had been experienced from 1973.
At the time, official data seemed squarely
aligned with the traditionalists and mainstream
forecasters. Despite persistently strong output
growth, and hence persistently one-sided forecast
errors, most forecasters projected a return to the
old trend growth. Inside the Fed, or more accu-
rately, at the Board of Governors in Washington,
D.C., Chairman Greenspan saw tantalizing evi-
dence of a pickup in productivity growth that
seemed simply inconsistent with what official
data indicated. In his view, the linkages between
reported data on profits, prices and costs did not
add up the way economic theory suggested. The
picture changed with subsequent revisions to
the data—in particular, the incorporation of soft-
ware as a fixed investment in the GDP accounts
in 1999—and econometric work by several econ-
omists. This research showed that Chairman
Greenspan’s intuition was essentially correct.
My point is not to rejoin that debate but
rather to emphasize that the benefits of enabling
technologies often evolve slowly, and the eco-
nomic shifts that they cause may be difficult to
recognize in the data. There is no easy way to
distinguish new trends from temporary aberrations
in existing trends. We should not, for example,
dismiss the promise of e-commerce or business-
to-business applications simply because they
have yet to take off. I am not making a forecast
one way or the other, but emphasizing that his-




So far, I have focused on technology. But, how
do innovation and technology transfer occur?
And, can governments do anything to encourage
more rapid technological progress and economic
growth? During the industrial revolutions of the
18th and 19th centuries, for example, private
individuals and firms produced most inventions
and did “technology transfer” largely without
government subsidies or direction. Although
economists are far from having a complete under-
standing of these issues, economic analysis pro-
vides some guidance.
First, government should “do no harm.”
Excessive regulation and rigidity can stifle the
transformation of innovations into applicable
technology. Many analysts have noted that few
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growth during the 1990s as rapid as did the United
States. In part, the explanation for such a differ-
ence may lie in the relatively less-regulated, more
flexible, and more competitive nature of U.S.
markets and business. The United States does a
good job of encouraging entrepreneurs.
Encouraging entrepreneurs seems simple until
we consider that new technology creates losers
along with winners. The transfer of new technolo-
gies—such as growing use of the steam engine,
electricity, the internal combustion engine, and
the microchip—changes the relative fortunes of
numerous firms and, in turn, the relative demand
for various types of labor. As a result, wages of
some workers will tend to increase rapidly—
while earnings and jobs in other industries will
contract. Government leaders must resist the urge
to “save” the latter industries lest, by so doing,
they foreclose gains for the overall economy.
While no one likes to observe layoffs and
business closings, these may signal the future
direction of the economy. Government must be
cautious not to interfere with these signals. It is
particularly damaging when governments protect
existing jobs by stifling innovation and blocking
entry of new products, services and producers.
Second, government must provide a secure
system of private property rights, including pro-
tection for intellectual capital. Douglass North,
the noted Washington University economic histo-
rian and Nobel laureate, has argued that a nation’s
institutions, including its government, are among
the most fundamental determinants of economic
growth. Economic performance tends to be better,
he argues, when government intervention in pri-
vate markets is minimal except for the enforce-
ment of private property rights. Secure property
rights, including clear ownership of intellectual
property via patents and copyrights, encourage
entrepreneurship and technology transfer.
Third, government must sponsor a strong
and widely available system of higher education.
Economist Paul Romer, a leading growth expert
at Stanford University, has argued that “…the
real success of American economic policy has
been to have moderately strong property rights
with lots of subsidies for inputs—like research
and education—that are used in the innovation
process.”
Many economic historians credit the U.S.
higher education system for our technological
prowess. The Morrill Act of 1862 created land
grant universities, thereby stimulating teaching
and research in both agriculture and engineering.
Within a decade after the Act’s passage, the num-
ber of engineering schools went from 6 to 70,
and later to 126 schools by 1917. In 1870, U.S.
engineering schools graduated 100 students; in
1917, they graduated 4,300. As early as 1890, the
ratio of university students per 1,000 primary
school students in the United States was two to
three times that of any other country. As late as
1914 the United States was well behind Europe
in scientific agriculture. A generation later, we
were the world leader. Today, our higher educa-
tion system is called upon to provide the new
talent to maintain our technology leadership.
Over the last 25 years or so, the college wage pre-
mium—the wages of college graduates relative to
those of high school graduates—has jumped 25
percent. A little more than a decade ago, about
39 percent of the population 25 years and older
had some form of college education; in 2000, the
proportion had risen to 50 percent. Technological
progress—turning innovations into applicable
technology—simultaneously depends on a well-




Finally, I come to my fourth thought of the
evening: the government, and more specifically,
the Federal Reserve, must follow sound macro-
economic policies consistent with a low, stable
rate of inflation.
The strength and duration of the current eco-
nomic expansion will ultimately depend on the
performance of the inflation rate. Low and stable
inflation reduces uncertainty regarding the future
health of the economy and, in turn, encourages
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able inflation increases risk, which induces cau-
tion among entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
The consequence is less innovation and less
application of known innovations.
Monetary policymaking requires an estimate
of the potential growth rate of the economy
because it gives us a sense of how fast the economy
can grow without developing inflationary imbal-
ances. Growth more rapid than the long-run path
can generate imbalances that threaten long-run
sustained prosperity. Yet, no policymaker wants
to unnecessarily slow a booming economy if the
economy’s performance reflects an acceleration
of productivity. Productivity increases are the
largest part of our economy’s long-run growth.
Even the recent, mild economic slowdown seems
to have done little to slow productivity’s acceler-
ation that started in the mid 1990s. Recent data
are highly encouraging; fourth-quarter produc-
tivity growth was more than 5 percent, and first
quarter growth could even be as high as a remark-
able 8 percent. As a result, unit labor costs have
decreased, corporate profits have increased, and
business investment spending is rebounding.
Many analysts now believe that the economy’s
sustainable productivity growth rate is approxi-
mately 2 to 2½ percent. A modestly higher rate
cannot be ruled out. Accepting the forecast of 2
to 2½ percent trend productivity growth, then
the economy’s long-run growth track, assuming
that the labor force increases approximately 1
percent each year, is approximately 3 to 3.5 per-
cent, about a percentage point higher than the
track that prevailed between 1973 and 1995.
Maintaining the higher track will raise the living
standards of future generations of Americans, as
well as those in countries we trade with. But this
outcome can only come to pass so long as inflation
remains low and stable.
Yet, we must be modest. Our understanding
of the determinants of productivity growth is too
imprecise to justify firm convictions about any
productivity growth forecast over the near term,
much less the long run. Given our incomplete
knowledge, therefore, it is important that we not
lock ourselves into a monetary policy that depends
on any particular rate of productivity growth.
Instead, policymakers must be on guard that an
increase in inflation does not derail the economy’s
long-run growth combination of innovation, pro-
ductivity and education.
I’ll finish with this observation: it is a lot
easier—a whole lot easier—to be a policymaker
in an environment of strong productivity growth
than in one of stagnation.
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